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Adaptation of European experience in compensation mechanisms for public transport operators in urban public transport in Ukraine

At present, one of the key directions for improving the efficiency of urban public transport systems is the formalization of contractual relations between public authorities and transport operators. These relations should consider such core aspects as the contract model, compensation calculation mechanisms, monitoring and KPI achievement systems, as well as the transparency of financial flows. European experience demonstrates that precisely these elements – combined with a clear allocation of risks and the application of bonus–penalty mechanisms – are decisive for improving the quality and efficiency of transport services. Particular attention is paid to the development of modern mechanisms for calculating compensation to public transport operators in urban public transport in Ukraine, taking into account European best practices and the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. Based on an analysis of the EU regulatory framework, academic research on the effectiveness of contractual models (gross cost, net cost, performance-based contracting), and the practical outcomes of their implementation in European cities, the key principles for organizing transparent and result-oriented contractual relations in the transport sector are substantiated. The analysis of Ukrainian legislation and existing compensation mechanisms reveals their fragmented nature, the absence of unified approaches across different transport modes, and a low degree of linkage between public funding and performance indicators. The proposed models are aimed at improving the quality of transport services, ensuring transparency of budget financing, and adapting the Ukrainian system to European standards for the provision of public transport services.
compensation to transport operators, urban public transport, KPI, public service contracts, Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, quality of transport services

Statement of the problem. The current stage of development of urban public transport in Ukraine is characterized by growing demand for improved quality of passenger transport services, financial stability of operators, and transparency of compensation mechanisms. The National Transport Strategy of Ukraine up to 2030 (Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1550-2024) defines Strategic Objective 2 as ensuring high-quality passenger transport services and barrier-free mobility for the population, which implies the establishment of economically sound mechanisms for financing public transport [1].

One of the key directions in this context is the development of compensation calculation methodologies for transport operators providing socially significant transport services, considering actual operating costs, passenger flow structures, and the accessibility of transport services for socially vulnerable population groups.

Analysis of recent studies and publications. The issue of effective development of urban passenger transport remains one of the priority areas of contemporary academic research and managerial decision-making within the framework of sustainable urban development. Improving service quality, ensuring the financial sustainability of operators, and enhancing the transparency of compensation mechanisms are actively discussed at the international level among researchers, economists, representatives of local authorities, and governmental institutions [2– 4].

In its strategic policy documents, the European Commission consistently emphasizes the importance of establishing a balanced transport policy focused on accessibility,

environmental sustainability, and economic efficiency of urban transport services. Accordingly, within European transport policy, significant attention is devoted to the creation of harmonized rules governing public transport organizations and compensation systems, aimed at ensuring transparent use of public funds and increasing the efficiency of transport services.

To achieve these objectives, one of the key legislative acts was adopted – Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, approved by the European Parliament and the Council on 23 October 2007. The development of this regulatory act was driven by the need to regulate the provision of public passenger transport services, ensure fair competition among operators, establish uniform principles of public financing, and clearly define the cases and conditions under which public authorities may compensate transport operators for incurred costs [5].

Although the Regulation was adopted in 2007, its implementation was not immediate. The European Commission recognized that both public authorities and transport operators would require time to adapt to the new regulatory framework. Therefore, the Regulation provided for a transitional period of ten years, during which Member States were expected to gradually align their contractual arrangements and financing systems with the established requirements. Full implementation of the Regulation began only in 2019, following the completion of the transitional phase.

During this period, cities across the EU undertook extensive efforts to adapt their transport systems to the requirements and recommendations of the Regulation. These efforts focused on establishing clear and transparent rules for granting public support to transport operators, introducing contractual models of interaction between public authorities and operators, and defining standards for public service obligations and corresponding compensation mechanisms.

Practical experience in EU countries shows that even with clearly defined regulatory requirements, full implementation of the new approach typically takes 8–12 years. This is due to the need to adapt governance structures, change the culture of interaction between authorities and transport undertakings, modernize contractual approaches, and establish effective financial mechanisms.

To date, several studies have sought to assess whether the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 has achieved its intended effects and to what extent. One of the key studies in this field is the *Study on the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road* (2016) [6], commissioned by the European Commission. The aim of this study was to evaluate the impact of Regulation 1370/2007 on the economic and financial performance of the public transport sector in EU Member States, including changes in funding levels, service quality, operational efficiency, and other performance indicators.

The study was based on the analysis of case studies from various European cities (metro, bus, and urban rail/tram systems), statistical data, stakeholder surveys, expert assessments, and comparative analysis. As a result of the analysis conducted, the main conclusions can be identified (Table 1).

Studies conducted by Sheng D. and Meng Q. (2020) [7] are devoted to assessing the effectiveness of contractual models used in organizing urban public transport services between public authorities and transport operators. The paper analyses how different types of contracts affect service quality, the financial stability of operators, and the interaction between public authorities and transport undertakings. The objective of the study was to systematize accumulated international experience and determine which contractual schemes (gross cost, net cost, performance-based contracts) deliver the best outcomes.

Table 1 – Key Results of the Study on the Impact of Implementing Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 in EU Member States

Research aspect	Key findings/conclusions
Change in public transport usage	During 2000–2012, public transport ridership increased on average by approximately 8%, which is partly attributed to improvements in service quality and attractiveness following the introduction of new standards.
Cross-country differences	The effects vary significantly between countries and cities; outcomes depend on national legislation, market structure, funding levels, and the administrative capacity of local authorities.
Transparency and financing	Increased transparency of funding, the introduction of clearly defined contracts, and properly structured compensation mechanisms are critical factors for achieving high-quality and accessible transport services.
Contractual models	Various contractual models are applied in Europe, including net cost, gross cost, cap-and-share, and gross cost contracts with bonus–penalty schemes; the choice of model depends on the local context. There is no universal solution.
Role of the state	Some countries transfer a larger share of risks to the operator (net cost contracts), while others ensure a significant level of public sector involvement in financing and control (gross cost contracts).
Contract formulation	Successful implementation of the Regulation is directly dependent on the clarity of contracts, including the definition of public service obligations, compensation mechanisms, principles of exclusivity, and risk allocation, as stipulated in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007.

Based on the aggregated data, the authors draw several key conclusions. First, the effectiveness of contractual models strongly depends on the local context, including the level of institutional development, market structure, and the capacity of public authorities to exercise effective oversight. Second, the mere existence of contracts does not automatically lead to improvements in service quality. The decisive factor is the content of the contract, the clarity of quality indicators, and the organization of the monitoring system. Third, different contractual models imply an uneven distribution of risks: net cost models are more effective where operators can influence demand, whereas gross cost contracts are better suited to markets with low or unstable passenger demand. The authors emphasize the absence of a universal solution, noting that any contractual model must be designed and adapted to the specific conditions of a given city and the capabilities of its transport system.

Several academic studies focus on analyzing how performance-oriented contracts between public authorities and transport operators affect operational efficiency. One such approach is Performance-Based Contracting (PBC), under which payments to the operator depend not on the number of trips operated or incurred costs, but on the achievement of predefined quality and performance indicators [8–9].

Within these studies, some authors apply economic modelling methodologies, enabling the construction of mathematical contract models in which operator performance is assessed using Key Performance Indicators (KPI) [8]. Other studies develop econometric demand models that allow forecasting passenger volumes based on elasticity estimates, thereby assessing how passengers respond to changes in service conditions. Subsequently, using a mathematically defined system of bonuses and penalties, researchers determine the

extent to which actual operator performance deviates from calculated target levels and the corresponding rewards or penalties to be applied [9].

In urban public transport systems, service quality is typically evaluated using a set of key performance indicators that enable a comprehensive assessment of operator performance. The most important indicators include:

- regularity of service provision and adherence to timetables;
- service fulfilment ratio;
- availability of rolling stock, defined as the share of technically serviceable vehicles ready for operation.

The KPI system also includes safety indicators, such as the number of accidents or incidents, as well as indicators of cleanliness and comfort inside vehicles, assessed through inspections or passenger surveys. In addition, the availability and reliability of information systems – such as electronic displays, fare validation systems, and GPS-based monitoring – are considered. An important indicator is also the level of user satisfaction, which reflects service quality from the passengers' perspective.

The introduction of performance-based contracts implies the transfer of a significant share of operational, technical, and service-related risks to the operator. At the same time, this model incorporates incentive mechanisms: when target KPI values are exceeded, the operator receives bonuses, which compensate for the increased level of responsibility and motivate the maintenance of high service quality.

Performance-Based Contracts (PBC) contribute to improving the quality of public transport services, as they incentivize operators to enhance service regularity, vehicle technical condition, passenger comfort, and overall user satisfaction. However, the application of this contractual model is only feasible under conditions of clearly defined KPIs, a transparent incentive scheme, and the implementation of sanctions in cases of non-compliance with established quality targets. PBCs demonstrate the highest effectiveness when combined with a gross cost model, in which the public authority retains control over tariff policy, while the operator focuses on meeting service standards. Traditional volume-based models (GCC, NCC) do not provide a comparable level of motivation, as payments are not directly linked to performance outcomes.

The key prerequisites for successful implementation of PBCs include reliable KPI measurement, transparency of the financial model, adequate oversight by public authorities, and a balanced allocation of risks between the contracting parties. At the same time, even when KPI systems are well defined, financial models are transparent, and effective public control mechanisms are in place, a fundamental conclusion remains there is no universal contract type. The selection of an appropriate contractual model must consider the specific characteristics of the city, passenger demand levels, and the institutional and managerial capacity of public authorities.

Empirical research results confirm the effectiveness of performance-based contracts in practice. In the city of Porto (the case of Metro do Porto, operated by a private sub concessionaire under a PBC arrangement), the period from 2010 to 2016 demonstrated the following outcomes: passenger-kilometers increased by 10.9 %, while the volume of services provided grew by only 8.9 %, indicating a better alignment of supply with actual demand. Operating costs per passenger-kilometer decreased by 19.5 %, non-subsidized revenues increased by 23.7 %, and the cost coverage ratio excluding subsidies rose from 72 % to over 110 %. These results demonstrate that PBCs are capable of simultaneously improving service quality, operational efficiency, and the financial sustainability of urban public transport systems [10].

Contractual models for the provision of transport services differ substantially in terms of compensation structures, risk allocation, and the degree of operator involvement.

Nevertheless, the existence of a regulatory framework such as Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 establishes a unified strategic direction for the development of relationships between public authorities and transport operators in the public transport sector. This approach is based on transparency, clearly defined obligations, measurable outcomes, and a strong orientation towards service quality.

The implementation of different types of contracts provides an effective tool for influencing both the quality of transport services and the operational performance of operators. However, no contractual model can ensure identical effects across different cities or countries, as each transport system operates under unique conditions, including passenger demand patterns, budgetary constraints, infrastructure characteristics, institutional capacity, and legal traditions.

Therefore, public service contracts should be designed individually for each country and each city, considering their specific needs, structural features, and strategic objectives for transport system development. Such an approach not only enables the adaptation of best European practices but also ensures a tangible, rather than purely formal, effect from their implementation.

At present, domestic researchers also devote considerable attention to the study of modernization of Ukraine's transport system in the context of European integration. Key research areas include the improvement of state transport policy, optimization of tariff-setting mechanisms, and the search for effective financial instruments to support urban transport operators.

Setting the task. Within the framework of Ukraine's European integration trajectory, the adaptation of the national compensation system to European standards becomes particularly relevant. According to Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, which defines the rules for the provision of public passenger transport services, compensation to operators must be transparent, economically justified, and limited to the level of net costs incurred in the provision of transport services.

The aim of the study is to analyse contemporary approaches and practices for calculating compensation to transport operators in urban public transport, taking into account European experience and the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, in order to develop an effective mechanism of financial support for operators. This mechanism is intended to improve the quality of passenger transport services and ensure the sustainable development of urban mobility in Ukraine.

Presentation of the main material. At present, there is a significant mismatch between the existing Ukrainian legislation and modern European approaches to the organization of urban public transport. The regulatory and legal framework of Ukraine remains fragmented and outdated and therefore requires comprehensive updating and harmonization with EU directives and regulations [11].

Currently, the operation of public transport in Ukraine is regulated by three main legislative acts, namely: "On Railway Transport", "On Urban Electric Transport", and "On Automobile Transport" [12–14]. Each of these legal acts governs different modes of transport, which hinders their integration and synergy. This particularly affects municipal enterprises that provide passenger transport services using multiple modes of transport.

At the same time, many private operators providing urban passenger transport services operate on a self-financing basis. The compensation provided by municipalities for the carriage of certain privileged categories of passengers does not fully cover the operators' costs, while operators retain all revenues generated from fare-paying passengers. One of the most challenging issues in implementing contractual models in Ukraine concerns the calculation of compensation for transport services provided, as well as the mechanisms for

applying penalties and bonuses to ensure the required level of service quality and for defining contract durations.

In most cities, compensation calculation methods differ between trolleybuses and bus passenger transport services. For trolleybus routes, a contractual model is applied under which the operator retains fare revenues from ticket sales, while additional compensation is calculated based on the number of vehicle-kilometers operated and as the difference between economically justified costs and planned revenues (including compensation for privileged passengers). Formally, this is expressed through a formula of the following type

$$C_{Trolley} = (T \times Q_{km}) - (R_1 + R_2 + R_3) + C_1, \quad (1)$$

where T – approved calculated tariff for transport services (cost per one vehicle-kilometer of passenger transport by trolleybus), UAH/trolleybus-km; Q_{km} – volume of transport work over the reporting period, trolleybus-kilometers;

R_1 – revenues obtained from core operating active ties, namely the carriage of fare-paying passengers in urban transport, UAH; R_2 – net revenue generated from the provision of ancillary services in other areas of economic activity, UAH; R_3 – net financial difference associated with the carriage of passengers entitled to free travel on electric public transport, UAH; C_2 – compensation for cancelled or unperformed trips.

For bus routes, the current compensation practice also предусматривает that the operator retains fare revenues from ticket sales on its balance sheet, while the municipality provides compensation primarily for the carriage of privileged passenger categories.

$$C = P_{bus} \, x \, T_{bus} \quad (2)$$

where P_{bus} – number of privileged passengers, according to data obtained from on-board accounting and validation devices installed in vehicles, passengers; T_{bus} – applicable fare per trip for a fare-paying passenger, UAH/passenger.

Such an approach creates inconsistencies between different modes of transport and generates a risk of “double financing” (fare revenues plus compensation), which complicates transparency and control over the use of public funds.

An analysis of existing compensation practices in Ukrainian cities has revealed the following shortcomings: fragmentation of compensation mechanisms across different transport modes; double payments; the absence of a unified methodology for calculating compensation for enterprises of different ownership forms and transport modes; insufficient linkage between compensation payments and performance indicators (KPI); and difficulties in adjusting compensation schemes in response to external factors such as inflation and fuel price fluctuations.

Based on the review of academic literature, the analysis of European experience in implementing public service contracts, and the assessment of the current state of Ukrainian legislation and compensation practices, the study proposes two alternative approaches to calculating compensation for transport operators that may be applied by Ukrainian cities in the context of public transport system reform.

The first option proposes the use of a contractual model in which compensation is calculated based on the volume of transport work performed. This contractual model предусматривает the transfer of all revenues generated from passenger fares to the balance sheet of public authorities (gross cost model).

Under this arrangement, the operator is remunerated for the actual kilometres operated, while all fare revenues are collected by the municipality. This approach strengthens public control, streamlines financial flows, and enables the introduction of bonus–penalty mechanisms linked to service quality.

The second option involves the application of a hybrid contractual model (gross cost + revenue sharing). This alternative system combines kilometre-based remuneration with partial retention of fare revenues by the operator. Such an approach preserves incentives for attracting a higher number of passengers, while simultaneously maintaining the level of control characteristic of the gross cost model.

In the study, each of these options is assessed against three key criteria:

- financial impact – projected municipal expenditures and revenue allocation;
- operational feasibility – applicability given the structure of the transport network and the level of digitalization;
- compliance with Ukrainian legislation – the degree of alignment with existing legal norms and the need for additional regulatory changes.

The core concept of the proposed contractual model based on compensation calculated according to the volume of transport work performed lies in the centralization of fare revenues (transfer of collected revenues from the operator to the municipality) and the payment of compensation to the operator based on operated kilometers, including an economically justified profit margin. At the same time, this option proposes the use of a single unified contractual model with a uniform compensation calculation principle for all modes of urban public transport.

$$C = ((P_{bus} \, x \, KM_{bus}) + (P_{trolleybus} x \, KM_{trolleybos})) + P_r - R^* + BON - PEN \qquad (3)$$

where P_{bus}, $P_{trolleybus}$ – price per kilometer of operation for the respective mode, UAH/km; KM_{bus}, $KM_{trolleybus}$ – number of operated vehicle-kilometres, km; Pr – economically justified profit for the operator, UAH; R^* – total verified revenue earned by the operator from the provision of local public transport services during the month for which compensation is granted. This includes revenue from ticket sales, income from other activities related to the provision of local public transport services, any grants or other forms of revenue support to which the operator is entitled under the contract, as well as all other operator revenues associated with the public transport services covered by the contract, UAH; BON – performance bonus awarded to the operator upon achieving the agreed KPI threshold values, UAH; PEN – performance-related penalty imposed on the operator when key performance indicators fall below the agreed minimum threshold levels, UAH.

The advantages of applying a contractual model in which compensation is calculated based on the volume of transport work performed include: unification of approaches across transport modes; predictability of payments; incentives for operators to deliver the planned volume of transport services; and the ability to introduce KPI-based bonus–penalty mechanisms.

The disadvantages include the need for accurate mileage accounting and monitoring (GPS, reporting systems), periodic adjustment of rates influenced by external factors, and legislative adaptation.

The application of the second, hybrid contractual model is better aligned with the current legislative framework in Ukraine, while at the same time enabling the introduction of measures aimed at improving service quality. The proposed model combines partial retention of revenues by the operator (for example, revenues generated from bus route services) with kilometre-based payments for trolleybus services. At the same time, it introduces adjustable rates, a system of bonuses and penalties linked to compliance with defined performance indicators and explicitly accounts for an economically justified profit.

The objective of applying this contractual model is to balance the interests of municipalities and operators, preserving incentives for operators to increase passenger demand while simultaneously ensuring transparency and accountability in the use of public funds.

$$C = (((P_{trolleybus} x\ KM_{trolleybus}) + P_r - R^*) + (P_{bus} x\ T_{bus})) - PEN \quad (4)$$

where $P_{trolleybus}$ – price per kilometre of operation for trolleybus services, UAH/trolleybus-km; $KM_{trolleybus}$ – number of operated trolleybus-kilometres, trolleybus-km; P_r – economically justified profit for the operator, UAH; R^* – total verified revenue earned by the operator from the provision of local public transport services during the month for which compensation is granted. This includes revenue from the sale of travel documents, income from other activities related to the provision of local public transport services, any grants or other forms of revenue support to which the operator is entitled under the Contract, as well as all other revenues derived from activities related to the provision of public transport services covered by the Contract, UAH; PEN – performance-related penalty imposed on the operator when key performance indicators fall below the agreed minimum threshold values, UAH; P_{bus} – number of privileged passengers, according to data obtained from on-board accounting and validation devices installed in vehicles, passengers; T_{bus} – applicable fare per trip for a fare-paying passenger, UAH/passenger.

The advantages of the hybrid approach include greater flexibility in accounting for local conditions, a reduced risk of fully transferring demand-related risks to the operator, and a more balanced alignment of the interests of municipalities and operators. However, this approach entails more complex administration.

The application of penalty mechanisms in contracts for the provision of urban transport services is based on systematic quality monitoring and the recording of violations that affect service levels. The process consists of several sequential stages: approval of normative KPI values at the contractual level; monitoring compliance with these standards; documentation of violations; review by the responsible authority; decision-making regarding the application of penalties; and formal notification of the operator. The operator has the right to appeal the decision; however, if the violation is confirmed, the operator is obliged to pay the penalty within the specified timeframe.

The calculation of penalties depends on the nature and frequency of violations, their severity, and their potential impact on passengers. In most Ukrainian cities, similar principles are applied: classification of the type of violation (e.g. failure to adhere to the timetable or inadequate technical condition of vehicles), determination of the degree of deviation from established standards, and application of a base rate or a percentage of the compensation amount. In practice, Ukrainian cities employ various approaches, including fixed penalties (e.g. in Pryluky and Chernihiv), proportional reduction of compensation based on unperformed trips (Oleksandriia), contract termination in cases of systematic non-compliance with schedules (Kyiv), or substantial penalties for each instance of violation (Zaporizhzhia and Odesa).

The main criteria for imposing penalties include punctuality, service regularity, safety, comfort, accessibility, environmental performance, and passenger satisfaction. Within the proposed model, it is planned to apply two key KPIs—punctuality and comfort—which must be achieved at a minimum level of 95%. Performance deviations within the range of 85–95% result in a reduction of compensation, while values below 85% may lead to the absence of compensation.

Conclusions. The research conducted demonstrates that the effectiveness of modern urban passenger transport systems largely depends on how transparently and economically sound compensation mechanisms for operators are designed by public authorities. The analysis of European experience and academic research in the field of transport contracting indicates that successful public transport systems are based on clearly defined contracts linked to measurable quality indicators (KPIs) and combine transparent financing, risk allocation, and well-designed incentive and penalty mechanisms.

At present, the domestic system of compensation calculation in almost all Ukrainian cities remains fragmented, varies by mode of transport, and often creates conditions for "double financing," which significantly complicates the control of public expenditures. These shortcomings are primarily driven by an outdated legislative framework, the absence of a unified methodology for compensation calculation, and a low level of integration of service quality monitoring systems.

Based on the analysis of European practices—particularly the implementation outcomes of Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 and successful applications of performance-based contracting (PBC) models (e.g. Metro do Porto)—this study develops two alternative approaches to compensation design: a per-kilometre gross-cost model with centralized fare revenue collection and KPI-based bonuses and penalties; and a hybrid model that allows partial revenue retention by the operator and adjustment of calculated rates depending on service quality performance.The application of these models enables a gradual transition toward European public transport governance practices and contributes to the development of sustainable urban transport systems in Ukraine.

Summarizing the findings of the study, the following key conclusions can be drawn:

- there is no universal contract model; its structure must be adapted to the specific characteristics of each city, including passenger flow patterns and the institutional capacity of local authorities;
- the key factor for success is the use of KPIs, which ensures that compensation is linked to the actual quality of services rather than solely to the volume of transport work performed;
- bonus–penalty systems are particularly effective, especially when combined with a gross-cost contracting model;
- reforming the Ukrainian compensation system is critically necessary to align it with European standards and to ensure the financial sustainability of transport operators;
- the proposed models can already be implemented in Ukraine, and their pilot application would represent an important step toward adapting the national transport system to EU requirements.

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Адаптація Європейського досвіду нарахування компенсацій перевізникам у міському громадському транспорті в Україні

Метою статті є аналіз та узагальнення підходів до формування механізмів нарахування компенсацій перевізникам у системі міського громадського транспорту з урахуванням європейського досвіду та вимог Регламенту (ЄС) № 1370/2007. У роботі досліджуються сучасні моделі договірних відносин між органами влади та транспортними операторами, а також їх вплив на якість транспортних послуг. Окрему увагу приділено можливостям адаптації європейських практик до умов функціонування громадського транспорту в українських містах.

У статті проведено аналіз нормативно-правової бази Європейського Союзу у сфері організації публічних пасажирських перевезень, зокрема положень Регламенту (ЄС) № 1370/2007 та практики його імплементації в містах країн ЄС. Узагальнено результати наукових досліджень щодо ефективності моделей договорів типу gross cost, net cost і договорів, орієнтованих на результативність (performance-based contracting). Проаналізовано чинні механізми компенсації перевізникам в Україні та виявлено їх ключові недоліки, серед яких фрагментованість підходів, відсутність єдиної методики та слабка прив'язка фінансування до показників якості. На основі європейського досвіду запропоновано два альтернативні підходи до формування компенсацій: покілометрову gross-cost модель із централізацією доходів та використанням KPI, а також гібридну модель, що поєднує елементи gross cost і розподілу доходів між містом та перевізником. Запропоновані підходи оцінено за критеріями фінансового впливу, операційної реалізованості та відповідності чинному законодавству України.

Результати дослідження підтверджують, що ефективна система компенсацій у міському громадському транспорті має базуватися на чітких договірних відносинах, прозорому фінансуванні та використанні показників ефективності. Встановлено, що універсальної моделі договору не існує, а вибір механізму компенсації повинен враховувати специфіку міста та управлінські можливості органів влади. Запропоновані моделі створюють передумови для підвищення якості транспортних послуг і адаптації української системи громадського транспорту до європейських стандартів.

компенсація перевізникам, міський громадський транспорт, KPI, договори надання громадських послуг, Регламент (ЄС) № 1370/2007, якість транспортних послуг

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